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Abstract
The issue of "spillover or contagion" effects has acquired renewed importance in light of
the Mexican crisis in December 1994 and the effect that this event has had on other emerging
market economies.  Relatively little empirical analysis exists on how small open economies are
affected by economic developments in their neighbors and what role financial markets play in
the transmission of disturbances.  This paper attempts to fill that gap by examining recent
developments in emerging equity markets in Asia and Latin America and longer term trends and
cycles in capital flows to Latin American economies and their sensitivity to events in the larger
countries in the region.  
  1/  See, for instance, International Monetary Fund (1995).
  2/  See Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (1995).
  3/  See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1994) and (1995).
I. Introduction
The issue of "spillover or contagion" effects has acquired renewed importance in light of
the Mexican crisis in December 1994 and the effect that this event has had on other emerging
market economies, particularly in Latin America. 1/  Relatively little empirical analysis exists on
how small open economies are affected by economic developments in their neighbors and what
role financial markets play in the transmission of disturbances.  In the wake of the Mexican
crisis several countries in Asia and Latin America experienced speculative attacks on their
currencies, sharp declines in their equity markets, and a deterioration in the terms in which they
could borrow from international capital markets.  
In Latin America, Argentina and Brazil came under the most severe pressure--between
December 1994 and March 1995, Argentina lost 18 percent of the deposits in the banking
system and about one-half of its foreign exchange reserves. 2/  In the height of the crisis, Brazil
implemented measures to stimulate capital inflows, by reducing or eliminating existing taxes on
foreign purchases of stocks and bonds.  By April, financial markets became calmer, and much of
the capital that had fled from these countries began to return.  In some instances, equity prices
(Chart 1) and foreign exchange reserves recovered to pre-crisis levels, in others not.  
The Asian experience on the wake of the Mexican crisis followed a different course. 
Initially, the countries that had attracted sizable capital inflows in recent years, (India, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) were relatively unaffected by events in Latin
America. 3/  However, during mid-January 1995 exchange rates in most of those countries (as
well as Hong Kong) came under increased speculative pressure; equity markets posted large
losses (see Chart 2).  In many cases, the central banks responded to these events by driving
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  1/  Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) argue that such herding behavior played a prominent role in
the recent ERM crisis, where in some instances, the attacks on the currencies could be justified by poor
macroeconomic fundamentals and in others not.
  2/  See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1995).
interest rates higher in an effort to defend the currency.  As in Latin America, not all countries
experienced the same degree or persistence of pressures; while in most instances, the
speculative attack lasted but a couple of days, in the case of the Philippines the pressures
persisted well into March.
Herding behavior by undiscriminating investors is often blamed for producing common
outcomes in countries with very heterogeneous fundamentals. 1/  Ind ed, it is difficult to trace a
common thread in key economic indicators in many of these economies.  Large current account
deficits, which are often blamed for Mexico's demise (see Chart 3), were present in Malaysia
and Thailand--they were also present in Colombia, one of the few Latin American countries
which was relatively unaffected by events in Mexico.  Brazil, which experienced considerable
turbulence, had a modest current account deficit at the time of the crisis (Chart 3).  The
presence of a fixed exchange rate regime is also pointed out as a reason why Argentina and
Brazil came under such extended pressure.  However, Hong Kong and Thailand have pegged
their currencies to the dollar since 1984, and the speculative pressures in those countries were
confined to a couple of days; the Philippines, which among the Asian countries was the hardest
hit, has a managed float.  A real exchange rate appreciation (possibly leading to an
overvaluation), is another factor commonly said to have precipitated the Mexican crisis. 
However,  Chile and Colombia (two of the Latin American countries that weathered the crisis
relatively well) had also experienced sharp real exchange rate appreciations in recent years. 2/ 
Indeed, the only common thread among the three countries most affected by the Mexican crisis,
Argentina, Brazil, and the Philippines, appears to be the absence on an established track record
in sound macroeconomic management and a rich history of failed stabilization plans.
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  1/  Such "spillover" effects may also characterize the interaction between industrial and developing
countries.  For instance, recent evidence suggests that volatility spillovers from the U.S. stock market to
stock markets in Mexico and Thailand are significant and may have increased in recent years (see
Folkerts-Landau, et al (1994)).
  2/  See Calvo and Reinhart (1995).
However, not all channels through which contagion can take place among small open
economies require the presence of “animal spirits.”  Fir t, spillovers may arise when two
economies have highly integrated capital markets.  In this case, shocks to the larger country are
quickly transmitted to the smaller one through trade in assets; the best and most documented
example of this type of integration in Latin America may be Argentina and Uruguay (see
Hoffmaister and Végh (1994), and Talvi (1994)). 1/  However, Mexico during the 1990s
appears to have had a growing influence on developments on nearby countries in Central
America, particularly as the trend toward greater financial market integration and more liberal
trade arrangements accelerated (see Calvo and Reinhart (1995)).  An example of strengthening
capital market ties is the recent arrangement between BANCOMEX and Costa Rican banks,
whereby the former offers a line of credit to the latter, in order to finance trade between Mexico
and Costa Rica. 2/
Second, trade patterns and arrangements play a role in the transmission of shocks (see
Ades and Chua (1993)).  Mexico had recently entered into trade agreements with Colombia and
Venezuela.  In addition, a bilateral free trade agreement between Costa Rica and Mexico went
into force on January 1, 1995; however, plans to extend it to the rest of Central America by
January 1996 are now uncertain.  The large real depreciation of the Mexican peso in early 1995
is likely to translate into fewer Mexican imports from other parts of Latin America and
elsewhere.  Further, in markets where Mexico competes with its smaller neighbors, the latter are
now at a relative disadvantage--increasing the pressure to regain competitiveness.  
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Third, institutional practices may also be a source of spillover effects.  For instance, in
response to a large adverse shock (such as the Mexican devaluation) a open-end emerging
market mutual fund expecting an increasing amount of redemptions will sell off its holdings of
equity in several emerging markets in an effort to raise cash.  However, given the illiquidity that
characterizes most emerging markets the sell-off by a few large investors will drive stock prices
lower.  Hence, the initial adverse shock to a single country gets transmitted to a wider set of
countries.  Indeed, among the 12 emerging stock markets shown in Charts 1 and 2, only
Colombia (where foreign participation in the stock market had been negligible), records a
sustained increase in prices following the crisis in Mexico.   
Fourth, a mechanism for such spillovers may be in the form of foreign investors first
selecting the larger, usually more familiar, countries as a place to invest (it is also the case that
the larger countries are more accessible to the foreign investor, as equity markets and financial
markets are often more developed).  As confidence in the region increases, other investment
opportunities are sought and the range of countries in the portfolio broadens.  
Fifth, recent studies on economic growth have stressed the role of technological factors
(Chua (1993) and Easterly and Levine (1994)) and political instability (Chua (1993)) in regional
contagion.  The five channels of transmission discussed thus far suggest that a large shock in a
neighboring country can change the fundamentals for other countries in that region.  
Finally, there are "bandwagon" effects, in which investor sentiment does not discriminate
among different macroeconomic fundamentals across countries (Eichengreen, Rose, and
Wyplosz (1995)).  In this case, even if the fundamentals of neighboring countries are not
affected by a shock to their neighbor, since the investor lumps everyone together self-fulfilling
crises can emerge.  The issue of "spillovers" is important for these small open economies, as it
potentially makes them vulnerable to not just external fundamentals in the form of changes in
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  1/  See, for instance, Karafiath, Mynatt, and Smith (1991), Park (1991), Smith (1991), Gay, Timme,
and Yung (1991), Kaufman (1992), Calomiris and Mason (1994).
the terms of trade, international interest rates, or the business cycle of large trading partners, but
to economic and political developments in neighboring countries. 
Rather than rely exclusively on anecdotal evidence, this paper examines whether there is
more rigorous evidence of contagion in emerging markets in Asia and Latin America during the
periods before and after the December 1994 Mexican crisis.  We also examine whether there is
evidence of “large neighbor effects” in capital flows to and from Latin America during the past
25 years.  In Section II we review the relatively scarce literature on contagion effects among
developing countries.  Section III examines the behavior of weekly stock returns and returns on
Brady bonds for a selected group of emerging markets in the period leading to and following
the Mexican crisis, with the aim of determining whether the degree of comovevement across
markets varied over time.  The aim of the empirical analysis in Section IV is to test the
hypothesis that there are longer-lived "contagion" or "spillover" effects in international capital
flows, over and beyond spillovers in moments of financial crises.  The final section concludes.
II. Contagion Among Developing Countries: The Literature
This section briefly reviews two strands in the literature on contagion effects.  The first
stresses herding behavior on the part of economic agents; the second focuses on "fundamental"
channels (i.e., trade, technology, etc.) through which contagion can take place.
1. Herding behavior
The literature on banking and financial crises in industrial countries has a long rich
literature on contagion effects. 1/  In the wake of a bank failure (usually that of a large or
prominent bank) depositors, confused and possessing imperfect information about the
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soundness of other banks rush to withdraw their deposits from the banking system at large.  The
stampede by depositors, generates a liquidity crisis which spreads the problems to the (initially)
healthy banks.  Thus, herding behavior by depositors alters the "fundamentals" for a broader set
of financial institutions and the crisis becomes self-fulfilling.  
Indeed, a similar story could be told about investors in international currency and equity
markets possessing imperfect information about country specific fundamentals.  Eichengreen,
Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) highlight that the countries that came under speculative attack
during the ERM crisis had heterogeneous macroeconomic fundamentals, and only in some cases
could the attack could be justified by the fundamentals.  Thus, their results place emphasis on
the important role played during the crisis by indiscriminating investors and speculators.
Further evidence of contagion in well developed financial markets has come from the
evidence of "excess co-movement" in stock and commodity prices (see Pindyck and Rotemberg
(1990) and (1993)).  After taking into account common fundamentals, these authors find that
there is residual comovement across stocks with very different industry and idiosyncratic
fundamentals.  Similar results emerge from their analysis of primary commodity prices.
With regard to emerging markets, however, relatively little is known about these issues. 
Doukas (1989), finds evidence that sovereign interest rate spreads for Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico have a contagious element.  "News" about the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower
affects the spreads charged to others.  The presence of common factors and "excess sensitivity"
to shared international fundamentals has also been detected in other variables which are related
to cross-border capital flows, such as the emerging country funds discounts (see Hardouvelis,
La Porta, and Wizman (1994)); these authors also link the observed comovement to U.S.
fundamentals and "investor sentiment".More recently, analyzing the behavior of closed-end
mutual funds on the wake of the Mexican crisis, Kramer and Smith (1995) note that closed-end
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  1/  While they argue against the use of the premia as a measure of investor sentiment, the fact remains
that the discount/premia showed a high degree of comovement despite large disparities in the country
fundamentals.
funds dedicated to Mexico and other Latin American countries showed a substantial degree of
co-movement following the December crisis and developed large premia. 1/    
2. Fundamental channels of contagion
The literature on "large neighbor" effects is small.  A recent set of papers in the
endogenous growth literature has suggested contagion effects may play an important role in
explaining the observed regional differences in growth performance.  Ades and Chua (1993)
find that political instability has strong negative effects on a country's per capita growth rate. 
They show that such instability disrupts trade flows, reduces investment, and increases military
outlays at the expense of other productive activities.  Chua (1993) and Easterly and Levine
(1994) also stress the role played by technology and human capital in giving rise to regional
contagion effects.  Such effects, it appears, help explain why Africa has had such a poor growth
record (Easterly and Levine (1994)).
Other papers have focused on specific country studies (Uruguay and Argentina) and on
the role played by capital market integration in transmitting disturbances across borders
(Hoffmaister and Végh (1994), and Talvi (1994)).  These studies have also found that large
neighbor effects are significant.
III. The Mexican Crisis and Emerging Markets
To examine the issue of contagion effects arising from either herding behavior or the
practices of open-end funds, we begin by focusing on some of the most popular emerging
markets during the early 1990s in Asia and Latin America.  The countries in Asia include: 
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand; the Latin American markets
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examined are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.  There are
large differences in foreign investor participation and market liquidity in these markets:  in Latin
America foreign participation was highest in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico and least in
Colombia and Venezuela; for Asia the range of variation is also large, with Malaysia and
Thailand, the more liquid markets, recording a higher share of foreign participation.
Table 1 presents the cross-country correlations on weekly stock market returns in US
dollars.  Two features are worth noting.  First, correlations among returns in the Latin American
markets increase during the period of market turbulence following Mexico's devaluation on
December 19, 1994.  The exception is Colombia, where the market continued to strengthen
immediately after the crisis began.  S co d, correlations with several of the Asian countries,
which had been mostly positive in the earlier period, turn negative.  Recalling that there are
marked discrepancies in macroeconomic fundamentals across countries within the regions
(Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993), (1994), and (1995) discuss many of these), these two
observations would appear to suggest that contagion in emerging markets may be regional
rather than global.  Having said that, it is the case that Asian markets were also subject to
speculative attacks, but these came in mid-January and were short-lived.
To further explore the issue of comovement we employ principal component analysis. 
We focus on two groups of time series; seven (one per country) for the Latin American
countries and six for Asian ones.  From these, we construct a smaller set of series, the principal
components, which explain as much of the variance of the original series as possible.  The
higher the degree of comovement that exists among the original series, the fewer the number of
principal components that will be needed to explain a large portion of the variance of the
original series.  In the case where the original series were identical (perfectly collinear), the first
principal component would explain 100 percent of the variation of the original series. 
Alternatively, if all the series are orthogonal to one another, it would take as many principal
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components as there are series to explain all of the variance in the original series; no advantage
would be gained by looking at common factors, since none exist. The procedure begins by
standardizing the variables, so that each series has a zero mean and a unit standard deviation. 
This standardization ensures that all series receive uniform treatment and that the construction
of the principal component indices is not influenced disproportionately by the series exhibiting
the largest variation.
The results are summarized in Table 2.  The top panel in Table 2 presents the results for
both regions, while the bottom two separate the Asian and Latin American markets.  All three
panels tell the same story, although the difference between the pre- and post-crisis periods
emerges more clearly from the regional subgroupings.  As noted in Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1993), the first principal component is closely linked to common external
fundamentals, such as international interest rates.  Not surprisingly, the explanatory power of
the first principal component increases markedly during the February 1994-mid-December 1994
period, when the Federal Reserve switched from an unchanged policy stance during 1993 to one
where policy was actively raising interest rates and tightening monetary conditions.  The
proportion explained by the first principal component remains stable during pre- and post-crisis
periods.  The second principal component, which may be capturing the "Mexico" effect,
increases in explanatory power during the post crisis period; it increases the most for Latin
America and the least when the two regions are aggregated.  Thus, it would appear, that
contagion effects were not altogether absent in Asia, they just took on a different modality from
that observed in Latin America.  It is interesting that for the Latin American countries, two
common factors account for 80 percent of the variance of highly volatile weekly stock market
returns.
Table 3, which presents the correlations among total returns on Brady bonds, paints a
similar picture, with correlations rising markedly on the wake of the Mexican crisis.  As with
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  1/  He used spreads on publicly guaranteed Euro-syndicated loans.
equity returns, the correlations are highest among the Latin American countries and lowest for
the Philippines, the only Asian country of our sample for which Brady bonds exist.  Indeed,
these correlation patterns appear to be consistent with Doukas' (1989), findings that sovereign
interest rate spreads for Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have a contagious element and that
"news" about the creditworthiness of a sovereign borrower affects the spreads charged to
others. 1/
IV. Foreign Shocks and More Persistent Forms of Contagion
In the remainder of the analysis, we turn our focus to Latin America and investigate
whether there is evidence of more durable forms of spillover effects, over and beyond those that
typically arise in moments of crises.  It is noteworthy that the surge in capital inflows during
1990-1994 in Latin America has not been limited to a few relatively large countries--there were
significant improvement in the capital account balances of the smaller countries as well.  While
the orders of magnitude of the change in the capital account balance as a percent of GDP are,
on average, somewhat less for the smaller countries, these nonetheless amount to a hefty 5
percent of GDP.  In this section, we first revisit the topic of the sensitivity of cross-border
capital movements to international interest rates along the lines of Calvo and Reinhart (1995). 
Second, we test for "spillover" effects in the capital account from the large countries to the
smaller ones.  
1. Preliminaries
The group of the larger countries includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru while the "small" country group refers to Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and
Uruguay. Since several of these countries have no quarterly balance of payments statistics, we
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use annual data for the balance on the capital account over the period 1970-93.  This is a much
longer period than is examined in other studies such as, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993),
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), and Fernandez Arias (1994), which focus on the
recent episode.  The main advantage of the longer sample is that it captures several important
turning points, including the debt crisis.  
As noted, the sensitivity of capital flows to external factors such as international interest
rates, the business cycle in industrial countries, and rates of returns on a variety of foreign
assets, has been examined in a number of recent papers (see Frankel (1994) for a summary of
this literature).  The dependent variables potentially affected by the foreign variables have
included international reserves and real exchange rates (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart
(1993)), bond and equity flows (Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), and total portfolio
flows (Fernandez Arias (1994)).  The main conclusion that emerges from these papers is that
external variables play a significant role, at least for the larger countries.  The measure of capital
flows used in this study, the balance on the capital account including errors and omissions, is
more comprehensive than in previous studies.  The capital account balance is expressed as a
percent of GDP; the real international interest rate used refers to a United States 3-month
Treasury bill rate adjusted by the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price index--an
"ex-post" measure of real returns. 
2. International interest rates, contagion, and capital flows
Given that the available capital account data is annual, thus limiting the number of
observations per country to 24, there are considerable efficiency gains from pooling the time
series data of the 11 countries in question.  We thus focus on a panel of countries where the
dependent variable is the balance on the capital account as a percent of GDP, while in this
simplest of settings, the independent variable is a real short-term U.S. interest rate.   
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  1/  See Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) and Calvo and Reinhart (1995).
To further examine the role of common shocks, and as an intermediate step in analyzing
whether there are spillover effects from the larger countries to the smaller ones, we use (as
before) factor analysis.  This is the same approach as in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993)
and is similar to the approach taken in Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994), who
examine the extent of comovement in emerging country funds discounts.  
For the capital account balance-GDP ratio, we construct the principal component indices
for the entire 1970-93 sample.  As far as the covariation of the balance in the capital account as
a percent of GDP, the share of the total variance explained by the first principal component is
about 40 percent for both sets of countries (Table A.1).  The main reason that the proportion of
the total variation accounted for by the first common factor is lower than for other external
variables, such as reserves and the real exchange rate is that the sample covers 24 years, in
which important country-specific developments take place. 1/  The most visible example of
idiosyncratic behavior during 1970-93 is El Salvador, where a civil war lasting 10 years affects
the performance of the capital account.  Not surprisingly, its weight in the constructed index is
far lower than any of the other countries.  Two less obvious examples where country-specific
factors play a key role are Colombia and Costa Rica, where capital account developments are
heavily influenced by sizable terms of trade shocks, such as the boom in coffee prices in the
latter part of the 1970s.
To test for spillover effects we next examine the dynamic interaction between capital
account developments between the small and large countries.  Here, we test the hypothesis that
there are "contagion" or "spillover" effects from the large countries to the smaller ones.  As
noted earlier, mechanisms for spillovers may be in the form of foreign investors first selecting
the larger countries as a place to invest in and, as confidence increases, diversifying the portfolio
among a broader range of countries or due to highly integrated goods and capital markets (see
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  1/  These test results are not reported but are available upon request.
  2/  Calvo and Reinhart (1995) test the hypothesis that interest rate elasticities may differ for smaller and
larger countries (since the composition of flows also differs for those two groups of countries) and find
no significant difference.
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Hoffmaister and Végh (1994), and Talvi (1994)).  We start with the basic relationship that links
the balance in the capital account (as a percent of GDP) for country i to the real rate of interest
in the U.S. and introduce the "large country index" of the capital account, described in Table
A.1, and denoted by LCI), lagged one period, as an explanatory variable for the small countries'
capital account balances.  Hence, in equation (1) below the dummy variable, d, assumes the
value of zero for the large countries and one for the small countries.  
The estimation strategy was not complicated by problems of nonstationarity in the
variables of interest, since the standard (Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-Fuller) unit root
tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. 1/  The fixed-effects estimator was used. Hence, in
equation (1), the intercept for country i, ái, varies across countries, while slope coefficients, the
âs, are constrained to be the same across countries or in the case of â2, for a subset of countries.
At the top of Table 4 we report these estimates for the period 1970-93. 2/  The results
indicate that a one percent decrease  in real interest rates in the U.S. would increase the capital
account balance/GDP ratio by 0.77 percent.  These results are consistent with the findings of
earlier studies; falling U.S. interest rates are associated with rising capital inflows to Latin
America.  A rise in U.S. interest rates (such as the one taking place since February 1994) would,
of course, tend to have the opposite effect.  
Hence, it appears that U.S. real interest rates play a significant role in determining the
pattern of capital flows, irrespective of whether these are proxied by changes in international
reserves and real exchange rates (Calvo, Leiderman, Reinhart (1993), portfolio flows (Chuhan,
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  1/  See Dooley (1988) and Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) on the issue of the "effectiveness" of
capital controls.
Claessens, and Mamingi (1993), and Fernandez Arias (1994)), or directly measured as the
balance on the capital account (this paper); these effects also appear to hold over a wide
variation of samples. 
To examine whether the trend toward more integrated capital markets has made capital
flows more sensitive to changes in international interest rates, we reestimate equation (1) over a
more recent subsample (1979-93).  There is very little change in the interest rate coefficient
suggesting that possibly, even in the earlier years, if capital controls were in place, these were
not binding (i.e., these were being successfully circumvented). 1/  It could also be that the
distinction between short-term "hot" money and long-term flows (which were relatively more
important in the 1970s) is more tenuous than widely believed--the Claessens, Dooley, Warner
(1993) hypothesis.  This latter explanation may also explain why there are no statistically
significant differences in the interest sensitivity of the smaller and larger countries, despite the
capital flows to the former are almost exclusively short term.
   With regard to contagion effects, Table 4 highlights that the lagged large country index of
the capital account enters significantly and with a positive sign, suggesting positive spillover
effects.  Rising capital inflows to the larger countries would, other things equal, tend to
eventually stimulate increased capital inflows to the smaller countries in the region.  This would
tend to suggest, for instance, that a successful stabilization program in one or more of the larger
countries (which increase inflows to that country) may have positive externalities for some of its
neighboring countries.  Further, the results for the more recent sample, 1979-93, (Table 4)
suggest that contagion effects may have increased, as the coefficient on the large country index
more than doubles.
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To gauge whether there is potential spuriousness in these results, we conducted the
opposite exercise asking whether capital account developments in the smaller economies
systematically affect the capital account of the larger countries.  Hence, the dummy variable, d*,
assumes a value of one for the large countries and a values of zero for the small ones; the small
country index is denoted in equation (2) by SCI.
Table 4 (third column), reports the results.  While, as before, the lagged aggregate index
enters with a positive sign, the coefficient is not statistically significant, in either of the samples,
suggesting a one-way causality from the larger countries to the small.
Given the prominent historical role played by Mexico in the region, the fact that it alone
accounted for over half of the recent capital inflows into Latin America, and the crisis that is
evolving there now, it is important to gauge whether developments in Mexico alone have
systematic repercussions in the other countries in the region.  To isolate spillover effects from
Mexico, equation (1) was reestimated where the large country index of the capital account was
simply replaced by the balance on the capital account balance (as a percent of GDP) in Mexico
(lagged one year).  The estimation results for the entire sample (Table 5) show that capital
account developments in Mexico have a significant and systematic impact on capital flows to
the other countries in the region; the coefficient on the Mexican variable is nearly unity.  During
the more recent period (1979-93), however, the coefficient on capital flows to and from Mexico
declines markedly to about 0.2 (although it remains significant); this implies that a change of
one percent in the capital inflow/outflow-GDP ratio from Mexico is associated with a 0.2
percent change in the capital inflow/outflow-GDP ratios in the other Latin American countries. 
In this specification capital flows appear to have become more interest sensitive in the recent
period.
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  1/  These results are not reported but are available from the authors.
While the coefficients on the international interest rate and large country index coefficient
are relatively stable over different samples, irrespective of whether a dummy variable for the
debt crisis years is included in the regression or not, the coefficient on the Mexican capital
account shows considerable instability across samples (Table 5), and its significance hinges on
whether a debt crisis dummy is included or not. 1/ This suggests that what may be relevant for
the smaller countries in Latin America are developments in a core set of countries in the region,
rather than developments in a single country.
V. Concluding Remarks
Several results emerge from the preceding analysis.  First, there is evidence that the
degree of comovement across weekly equity and Brady bond returns for emerging markets in
Latin America increased in the wake of the Mexican crisis.  Given the heterogeneity in
macroeconomic fundamentals across countries, such comovement could be interpreted as
indications of herding behavior on the part of investors.  Alternatively, an open-end emerging
market mutual fund expecting an increasing amount of redemptions will sell off its holdings of
equity in several emerging markets in an effort to raise cash.  Given the illiquidity that
characterizes most emerging markets the sell-off by a few large investors will drive stock prices
in other markets.  Second, while the degree of comovement following the crisis increased in
both Asia and Latin America, regional patterns differed, suggesting contagion may be more
regional than global.
Third, as in several earlier studies, our results suggest that international capital
movements, in our case, the balance on the capital account, are all significantly affected by
swings in interest rates in the United States.  Increases in U.S. interest rates, other things equal,
are associated with capital outflows from Latin America.  Small and large countries appear to be
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equally vulnerable in this respect.  Four h, in addition to external factors, the capital account
balance of small countries appears to be affected by developments and trends in the larger
countries in the region--these are more persistent forms of contagion than those that are
typically associated with a crisis.  Specifically, capital inflows/outflows into the larger countries
in the region, other things equal, tend to encourage increased inflows/outflows to the small
countries.  The opposite is not true.  Capital account developments in the smaller countries
appear to have no systematic impact on the larger countries in the region.  Lastly, wh ther
capital account developments in Mexico alone have significant consequences for other countries
in the region depends importantly on the sample period chosen.  Hence, this suggests that what
may be relevant for the smaller countries in Latin America are developments in a core set of
countries in the region, rather than developments in a single country.
Sound macroeconomic management is advisable, irrespective of whether the capital
account is in deficit or surplus (or whether the country is large or small).  However, the main
policy implication that emerges from this analysis is that policymakers are advised to be extra
cautious in protecting the domestic financial system against the vagaries of international capital
flows, as these appear to respond to a contagious element that may be unrelated to domestic
macroeconomic fundamentals.
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Table 4.  Foreign factors and "Contagion effects": 
Evidence from a Panel of Latin American Countries
Dependent Variable: 
Balance on the Capital Account as a Percent of GDP
 U.S. real ex-post"Large Country"Small Country"
short-term interest rateIndex Index
Number of 
Observations: 264
Estimation period: 1970-93
Small Countries -0.66  0.90 ****
         (0.13)     (0.49)
Large Countries -0.66  ****  0.60
         (0.13)           (0.44)
Estimation period: 1979-93
Small Countries -0.70  2.07 ****
              (0.15) (0.57)
Large Countries -0.70  ****  0.51
         (0.15)          (0.52)
Notes:  The countries that make up the large country panel are:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  The countries in the small country panel are:  Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay.  Standard errors are in parentheses.   
Table 5.  Foreign factors and "Contagion effects" from Mexico 
Dependent Variable: 
Balance on the Capital Account as a Percent of GDP
 U.S. real short-term   Mexico
interest rate
Number of 
Observations: 264
Estimation period: 1970-93
All Countries -0.14  0.98
       (0.03)    (0.02)
Estimation period: 1979-93
All Countries -0.74  0.17
       (0.17)    (0.08)
Notes:  The countries that make up the large country panel are:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  The countries in the small country panel are:  Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay.  Standard errors are in parentheses
Table A.1.  Composition of the "Large" and "Small" Country Indices
Weights 
Country Capital 
                        Account
Balance
1970-93
Larger Countries
Argentina   0.34
Brazil   0.74
Chile   0.71
Colombia   0.19
Mexico   0.74
Peru   0.74
R2   0.38
Small Countries
Costa Rica    0.31
Dominican Republic   0.68
Ecuador   0.74
El Salvador     0.06
Uruguay   0.77
R2    0.42
Sources: Information Notice System, International Financial Statistics, World Economic
Outlook, IMF, and the authors.
Notes:  Balance on the capital account includes errors and omissions and is expressed as a share
of GDP.  The weights attached to each country are the factor loadings associated with the first
principal component.  The R2 gives the proportion of the variance of the original series
explained by the constructed index (i.e. the first principal component).
